Combined, essence and form can have the following combinations:
1. Essensi that can not have a form, and something similar is called by Ibn Sina mumtani ' is something impossible (- impossible being).
2. Essensi that may have a form and may also have no form. This one is called mumkin , which is something that may be tangible but may also be intangible. An example of this is that this nature that did not exist then exist and will eventually be destroyed into nothing.
3. Essentials that must not have to have a form. Here essence can not be separated from being. Essence and being are the same and one. Here the essence is not begun by the intangible and tangible, as it is with the essence in the second category, but the essence must be and must have the form forever. The like is called the material ie God. It is this obligatory manifestation that manifests mumkin al wujud.
In the division of being to obligatory and possible, it seems that Ibn Sina is influenced by the division of the mutakallimun form to: baharu (al-hadith) and Qadim (al-Qadim). Because their proposition of the form of God is based on the distinctions of "new" and "qadim" that require that people say, everyone who exists besides God is new, preceded by an age in which God does nothing. This stance resulted in the paralysis of God's mercy in an age that preceded the realm of this being, so that God was not generous at one time and most benevolent at other times. In other words his deeds are not Qadim and not necessarily obligatory. To avoid such a state of God, Ibn Sina states from the beginning "that the cause of need for al-obligation (God) is possible, not new". This statement will lead to the active act of God since Qadim, before the Age.
From that opinion there is a difference between the thinking of mutakallimin with Ibn Sina's thought. Where mutakallimin anatar qadim and baharu more in accordance with religious teachings about God who made nature according to His will, while the argument of Ibn Sina in him contained the Greek thought that God is subject under "necessity", so that His actions have existed at once since qadim.
"Divine deeds" in Ibn Sina's thought can be summarized in the following 4 notes:
First, non-continuous deeds (ghairi mutajaddid) are deeds that have been completed before the times and nothing else new. In the book of An-Najah (p.372) Ibn Sina said: "The obligatory being (the Lord) is mandatory (must) of all sides, so it is not too late any other form (muntazhar form) - from his wuwud, in fact all that is possible become obligatory with Him. There is no new will for Him, no new tabi'at, no new science and no new attributes of His Essence ". Thus the works of God have been completed and perfect since qadim, nothing new in Ibn Sina's thought, as if this world no longer need to Allah after created.
Second, the Divine act is of no purpose. As if it had been lost from the deeds of nature that Ibn Sina considers as the essence of God, and only as a mechanical act because there is no purpose at all.
Thirdly, when God's deeds are finished and do not have any meaning, to come out of Him on the basis of "the law of necessity", like mechanical work, not of choice and free will.
What is meant in this third note is that Ibn Sina attributes the lowest qualities to God because from the beginning he describes "necessity" to Allah from every angle. As a result, the effort to establish the ritual of God afterwards becomes useless, because the irradiation is no longer free at all and the act that comes out of the will is necessity in the real sense. So there is no freedom and will whilst the necessity has been wrapped around God up to His deeds, more so on His Essence.
Fourth, the act is merely "giving form" in a certain form. To give this form Ibn Sina called it by several names, such as: shudur (out), faidh (overflow), luzum (must), wujub anhu (required of it). These names were used by Ibn Sina to free himself from the thought of "Creation of the Religion", because he was at a crossroads of anatara using the concept of God as the "cause" (illah fa'ilah) like the teachings of religion with the concept of God as the cause of purpose (Illah ghaiyyah) who acts as a giver to matter so that it moves toward it gradually to gain perfection.
In these four records the historical writers and critics of Ibn Sina always understood that Ibn Sina used the first concept of God's concept as "cause of maker". It did not occur to them that Ibn Sina probably used the second concept, which states that God does not create, but only as a "destination". All beings are coveting God and moving towards Him as Aristotle's conception of the beauty of art in the relation of nature to God.
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